REMARKS

Claims 1-54 are pending in the application.

Claims 1-54 have been rejected.

Claims 26, 42 and 43 have been objected to.

Claims 1, 10, 17, 23, 26, 42, 43, 48, 51 and 52 have been amended, as set forth herein.

I. <u>CLAIM OBJECTIONS</u>

Claims 26, 42 and 43 were rejected objected to due to informalities. Claims 26, 42 and 43 have been amended to correct the noted informalities.

II. REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102

Claims 1, 4-5, 8-10, 13-17, 22-23, 28-29, 47 and 48 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by McDonough (US Patent No. 5,625,748). The rejection is respectfully traversed.

A cited prior art reference anticipates the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102 only if every element of a claimed invention is identically shown in that single reference, arranged as they are in the claims. MPEP § 2131; *In re Bond*, 910 F.2d 831, 832, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Anticipation is only shown where each and every limitation of the claimed invention is found in a single cited prior art reference. MPEP § 2131; *In re Donohue*, 766 F.2d 531, 534, 226 U.S.P.Q. 619, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

In view of the Office Action's comments regarding the term "score," Applicant has amended certain claims to replace the term "score" with "value" and the term "total score" with "final measurement criteria value." Applicant also notes the Examiner's consideration of Applicant's prior arguments and the Examiner's response thereto.

McDonough recites a system that classifies communications into different topics. (Col. 4, Lines 27-34). The system includes a speech event frequency detector. (Col. 5, Lines 45-48). The speech event frequency detector identifies the frequency at which various words or phrases appear in a communication. (Col. 6, Lines 23-29). The communication is then classified based on the frequency that the words and phrases are used. (Col. 5, Lines 62-64). McDonough simply describes classifying communications based on the frequency at which words and phrases appear in the communications.

With respect to independent Claims 1, 10, 17, 23, 47, and 48 (and their dependent Claims), McDonough fails to show associating values to the voice representations (each corresponding to a different word or phrase) detected by the system and using the final criteria measurement value (incremented by the value(s) for each voice representation of a word or phrase is found in the received voice information) to select an action to be performed. The Office Action asserts that McDonough discloses a score associated with each voice representation, citing Col. 6, lines 41-42. McDonough describes "topic" modeling and estimating parametric probabilistic models for event frequency in the form of multinomial distributions, etc. Col. 6, lines 30-42. It is unclear how these probabilistic models and distributions translate to "a value" for each stored voice representation

(corresponding to a word or phrase). McDonough, therefore, fails to anticipate "one or more voice representations," where each voice representation is "associated with a value" as those features/elements are described in Applicant's specification.

In addition, McDonough fails to anticipate analyzing a voice message (or information) to "generate a final criteria measurement value associated with the voice message [information]" and performing one or more of the stored actions "based on the final criteria measurement value." The Office Action points to the summation of confidence scores over the speech data (Col. 7, lines 28-44) in support of its anticipation. However, McDonough appears to simply to use probabilities to detect the likelihood that a word or phrase is present in the speech, and then using it to calculate the expected number of occurrences of the word or phrase. In contrast, the claims recite that a value is associated with a particular stored voice representation (and for example, the values may be different based on the identity of the voice representation). Based on this, not only is the number of times the word or phrase (ie., voice representation) is present in the speech determined, but the values allow a final criteria measurement value to be calculated – with the final criteria measurement value providing the ability to weight various words/phrases with respect to each other (some may be more important than others, when detected). As a result, Applicant respectfully submits that the method of using confidence scores in McDonough does not provide a final criteria measurement value -- as that term is described and utilized in the Applicant's specification -- associated with the speech segment (at issue) based on the number of occurrences - McDonough is simply determining the expected number of occurrences, without reference to a final criteria measurement value based on the assigned value per stored voice representation.

Based on the foregoing, McDonough fails to show each and every element of Applicant's invention as recited in independent Claims 1, 10, 17, 23, 47, and 48 (and their dependent claims).

Accordingly, the Applicant respectfully requests the Examiner withdraw the § 102(b) rejection of Claims 1, 4-5, 8-10, 13-17, 22-23, 28-29, 47 and 48.

III. REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103

Claims 2, 11, 18, 24, 30, 32, 35-37, 39-41, 43-46 and 49-50 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough (US Patent No. 5,625,748) in view of Furui (Sadaoki Furui, "Digital Speech Processing, Synthesis, and Recognition," Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 1989, pp. 225-289). Claims 6-7, 20-21, 26-27 and 51-52 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough (US Patent No. 5,625,748) in view of Epstein (US Patent No. 6,327,343). Claims 3, 12, 19, 25, 31, 33-34, 38, 42, 45 and 53-54 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough (US Patent No. 5,625,748) in view of Furui (Sadaoki Furui, "Digital Speech Processing, Synthesis, and Recognition," Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, 1989, pp. 225-289), and further in view of Epstein (US Patent No. 6,327,343). The rejections are respectfully traversed.

In ex parte examination of patent applications, the Patent Office bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness. MPEP § 2142; In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1262,

23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The initial burden of establishing a *prima facie* basis to deny patentability to a claimed invention is always upon the Patent Office. MPEP § 2142; *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 U.S.P.Q. 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Only when a *prima facie* case of obviousness is established does the burden shift to the applicant to produce evidence of nonobviousness. MPEP § 2142; *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Rijckaert*, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1993). If the Patent Office does not produce a *prima facie* case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of a patent. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Grabiak*, 769 F.2d 729, 733, 226 U.S.P.Q. 870, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teachings of the prior art itself suggest the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art. In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993). To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three basic criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. The teaching or suggestion to make the claimed invention and the reasonable expectation of success must both be found in the prior art, and not based on applicant's disclosure. MPEP § 2142. In making a rejection, the examiner is expected to make the

factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467

(1966), viz., (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and

the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art. In addition to these factual

determinations, the examiner must also provide "some articulated reasoning with some rational

underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." (In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988, 78

USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.

1727, 1741, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1396 (2007)).

As described above, independent Claims 1, 10, 17, 23, 30, 37, 41, and 44 are allowable over

McDonough. In particular, McDonough fails to recite the use of "one or more voice representa-

tions" each "associated with a value," analyzing a voice message (or information) to "generate a final

criteria measurement value associated with the voice message (or information)," and performing one

or more actions "based on the final criteria measurement value." McDonough also fails to recite

analyzing a voice message to determine if the voice message exhibits a "predetermined pattern of

speech," where the predetermined pattern of speech represents "at least one of a tone of speech in

the voice message and a frequency of the speech in the voice message." The Office Action fails to

indicate that the remaining references disclose, teach, or suggest these elements of the independent

claims. Therefore, Claims 2-3, 6-7, 11-12, 18-21, 24-27, 31, 33-34, 38, 42, and 45 are therefore

allowable due to their dependence from allowable claims.

Similarly, regarding Claims 51-54, the Office Action relies on Epstein simply to show the

use of a computer readable medium. The Office Action fails to indicate that Epstein discloses the

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use of "one or more voice representations" each "associated with a value," analyzing a voice message to "generate a final criteria measurement value associated with the voice message (or information)," and performing one or more actions "based on the final criteria measurement value" as recited in Claims 51-52. The Office Action also fails to indicate that Epstein discloses analyzing a voice message to determine if the voice message exhibits a "predetermined pattern of speech," where the predetermined pattern of speech represents "at least one of a tone of speech in the voice message and a frequency of the speech in the voice message" as recited in Claims 53-54.

With respect to independent Claims 30, 37, 41, 44, 49, and 50 (and their dependent claims), McDonough fails to show analyzing the tone and/or frequency of speech in a voice message to determine which action to perform. The Office Action points to Furui as teaching this element/feature. Furui does not appear to describe performing one of the stored actions - as that term is described in the Applicant's specification - if the predetermined speech (a tone of speech or a frequency of speech) is found to occur. In addition, McDonough fails to disclose or describe analyzing a voice message to determine if the voice message exhibits a "predetermined pattern of speech," where the predetermined pattern of speech represents "at least one of a tone of speech in the voice message and a frequency of the speech in the voice message" and performing one or more of the stored actions if the predetermined speech is found. Furui simply does not teach all of these elements/features omitted from McDonough. As a result, the proposed McDonough-Furui combination fails to disclose, teach or suggest each and every element of Applicant's invention as recited in independent Claims 30, 37, 41, 44, 49, and 50 (and their dependent claims). With respect

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to the proposed combination, Applicant respectfully submits that the Office Action rationale does

not appear to provide an articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal

conclusion of obviousness.

Accordingly, the Applicant respectfully requests withdrawal of the § 103(a) rejections of

Claims 2-3, 6-7, 11-12, 18-21, 24-27, 30-46 and 49-54.

IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

As a result of the foregoing, the Applicant asserts that the remaining Claims in the

Application are in condition for allowance, and respectfully requests an early allowance of such

Claims.

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If any issues arise, or if the Examiner has any suggestions for expediting allowance of this Application, the Applicant respectfully invites the Examiner to contact the undersigned at the telephone number indicated below or at rmccutcheon@munckbutrus.com.

The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees connected with this communication or credit any overpayment to Munck Butrus Deposit Account No. 50-0208.

Respectfully submitted,

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